【主题】Why Do Firms Defer Training?
【报告人】殷臻达（北大汇丰商学院）
【时间】6月2日（星期二）2:00-3:30 PM
【参会链接】https://zoom.com.cn/j/97865654664 密码：134010
【语言】英文
【摘要】There is a large human-capital literature on why do firms pay for investments in general training. However, most existing models employ two-period frameworks and presume that firms may invest in training only in period one. We study a generic framework, whereby firms may invest in training in both periods, to explore in what circumstances firms will defer training investments to period two. The equilibrium not only nests Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) but also generates novel insights concerning the structure of wages and investments in general trainining. We show that a range of plausible mechanisms—job changes, learning by doing, poaching, retention, belated information, and asymmetric information—can engender deferred training.
【论文】暂无
【报告人简介】北京大学汇丰商学院助教授，康奈尔大学经济学博士。研究领域为劳动/人事经济学、产业组织、应用微观经济学。曾为Journal of Industrial Economics、Journal of Labor Economics、RAND Journal of Economics等国际经济学期刊担任审稿人。
