Kreps & Scheinkman with Product Differentiation

Stephen Martin 

Author information


Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906, USA

E-mail: smartin@purdue.edu


Abstract


Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.


Keywords


Kreps and Scheinkman, capacity choice, Cournot, oligopoly, product differentiation 


Cite this article


Stephen Martin. Kreps & Scheinkman with Product Differentiation. Front. Econ. China, 2019, 14(2): 203‒219 https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-008-019-0011-4 

关于我们 | 联系我们 | 友情链接 | 高等研究院 | 财大首页
版权所有:上海财经大学 地址:上海市杨浦区武川路111号上海财经大学高等研究院307室 邮编:200433