A Model of Endogenous Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly

Cheng-Zhong Qin, Dandan Zhu, Shengping Zhang

Author information




a Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA

b Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA

c Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

E-mail: qin@econ.ucsb.edu (Cheng-Zhong Qin), zhu@econ.ucsb.edu (Dandan Zhu), zsp@gsm.pku.edu.cn (Shengping Zhang)

Abstract




A network approach is proposed to analyze the formation of cross-holdings and anti-competitive implications. Our approach is motivated by the bilateral arrangement of passive ownership between Microsoft and Apple in 1997. We provide a complete characterization of pairwise stable cross-holdings for a model of Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous product. Our results strengthen the competitive implications of endogenous cross-holdings in Cournot oligopoly found in the literature.

Keywords




cross-holding, Cournot equilibrium, oligopoly, pairwise stability

Cite this article




Cheng-Zhong Qin, Dandan Zhu, Shengping Zhang. A Model of Endogenous Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly. Front. Econ. China, 2017, 12(3): 465‒479 https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-006-017-0020-6


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