A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining 

Yi Jin, Jianbo Zhang

Author information


a Department of Economics, Monash University, Caulfield East, VIC 3145, Australia

b Department of Economics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA

E-mail: jbzhang@ku.edu(Jianbo Zhang)


Abstract


In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with alternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariantmeasure of a column stochastic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.


Keywords


multilateral bargaining , heterogeneous discount factors , stationary SPE 


Cite this article


Yi Jin, Jianbo Zhang. A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining. Front Econ Chin, 2013, 8(2): 272‒287 https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-002-013-0014-1 


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