【主题】The Paradox of Search Effort and Rational Labor Stampedes
【报告人】何超（华东师范大学助理教授）
【时间】5月19日（星期三）10:00-11:30 a.m.
【地点】上海财经大学高等研究院楼232室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Standard labor search and matching models feature procyclical search intensity and quick recoveries. Both predictions are at odds with the US labor market after the Great Recession. This paper shows that in an otherwise standard model that incorporates multi-market simultaneous search, a temporary financial crisis can raise both search intensity and unemployment persistently, like a stampede to an unemployment trap—workers search harder but end up discouraging job creation—while the conventional wisdom says that search effort complements hiring. The observed productivity shocks, on the other hand, reduce search effort and do not cause such hysteresis.
