【主题】A Theory of National Development Bank: Long-Term Investment and the Agency Problem
【报告人】江深哲（北京大学新结构经济学研究院助理教授）
【时间】12月22日（星期三）2:00-3:30 p.m.
【参会链接】https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82149867950 密码：107916
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper applies the contract theory to study the role of National Development Bank (NDB) in financing long-term investment. We develop a principal-agent contracting model for application to an infrastructure construction problem. Our model suggests that the government employes the NDB loans to implement the optimal capital structure of an infrastructure project and mitigate overrun issues resulting from the agency problem during the infrastructure construction. In addition, we endogenize the NDB investment strategy to study the determinants of NDB profitability and use cross-country panel data to empirically test our model predictions.
