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上财高研院多篇论文被经济学领域权威期刊接受发表

发布日期:2022-06-11设置

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近日,我院李昊洋助教授、蒋荷露助教授等2位老师分别在国际二类期刊接受发表论文,戴大荣助教授也于此前在国际二类期刊在线发表论文1篇,关切前沿经济学研究,展现了卓越的学术能力与追求

高等研究院坚持政策研究与学术研究两手抓两手硬。2021年,研究员累计在《经济学(季刊)》、International Economic Review、Journal of Monetary Economics等国内外权威期刊上发表22篇论文,整体发文情况呈现稳健增长,助力“上财国际2.0”计划的推进和学校国际学术话语权的提升,百年变局和世纪疫情的特殊时期贡献智库力量。


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李昊洋助教授的合作论文“Emission Pricing, Emission Rebound, and the Coverage Scope of Incomplete Regulations” (合作者为中央财经大学吴楠助教授) 被Journal of Environmental Economics and Management接受发表。


Abstract
This paper studies the emissions pricing of incomplete regulations when accurate firm-level information is unavailable. In an economy with monopolistically competitive heterogeneous firms, the equilibrium can be sufficiently characterized by an aggregate statistic, which we call the ‘‘coverage scope’’. Given the coverage scope, emissions leakage to the unregulated firms results in a ‘‘U-shaped’’ relationship between the aggregate emissions and emissions price. As the coverage scope expands, the second-best emissions price increases. Firm heterogeneity and market power, the two defining features of the monopolistically competitive economy, affect emissions pricing differently. While both of them affect the second-best emissions price indirectly through coverage scope, market power has an additional direct effect. As a result, the optimal emissions price does not always decrease in market power, which contrasts the traditional wisdom on emissions pricing under complete regulations. A multi-sector model is numerically simulated using parameters for five Chinese manufacturing sectors to be incorporated into a proposed national carbon emissions pricing program. Quantitatively, the second-best price varies substantially with coverage scope and market conditions.



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李昊洋
美国密歇根州立大学博士毕业,现任上海财经大学高等研究院助教授,研究领域为资源与环境经济学、农业经济学,研究成果发表于Journal of Environmental Economics and Management、American Journal of Agricultural Economics、Resources, Conservation & Recycling等权威期刊,主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。


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蒋荷露助教授的合作论文“Skill-Biased Entrepreneurial Decline”(合作者为Faisal Sohail,墨尔本大学助理教授)被Review of Economic Dynamics接受发表。


Abstract
The U.S. is undergoing a long-term decline in entrepreneurship. We show that this slow-down in entrepreneurship has been more pronounced for skilled individuals – those with a college degree. We document new facts on the skill-biased nature of declining entrepreneurship and propose that it is a response to the rising worker skill premium observed over the same period. In support of this, we find that workers' earnings grew faster than entrepreneurs', particularly for skilled individuals, discouraging the pursuit of entrepreneurship. To quantify the impact of the skill premium on entrepreneurship, we develop a model of occupational choice with worker heterogeneity. In the model, a rising skill premium – driven by skill-biased technological change – contributes little in lowering entrepreneurship. Instead, around 70% of the observed decline in entrepreneurship is driven by skill-neutral technological change and a rising share of college graduates. A rise in the skill premium interacts with these forces to generate the skill-biased decline, and in doing so, shifts the composition of entrepreneurs towards the unskilled, lowering average entrepreneurial productivity. Our findings suggest an integral role for the changing income structure of workers in driving the broader decline in business dynamism in the U.S.



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蒋荷露
美国华盛顿圣路易斯大学经济学博士,现任上海财经大学高等研究院助理教授,研究领域为增长与发展、劳动经济学、人口经济学、创新与企业家市场等,主持上海市浦江人才计划项目,参与国家自然科学基金重大项目等。


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戴大荣助教授的合作论文“Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations”(合作者为田国强教授)被Social Choice and Welfare在线发表。


Abstract
We study majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of workers who can migrate between two competing jurisdictions. Both skill level and migration cost are the private information of each worker who will propose an allocation schedule that maximizes the utility of her own type. We identify reasonable scenarios in which the first-order approach applies and hence the second-order sufficient condition for incentive compatibility is fulfilled; otherwise, we need to apply the ironing surgery developed by Brett and Weymark (Games Econ Behav 101:172–188, 2017). Under quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, we show that the tax schedule proposed by the median skill type is the Condorcet winner, and provide a complete characterization of this tax schedule. While this schedule features negative marginal tax rates for low-skilled workers, it features positive rates for high-skilled workers with small migration elasticities; the marginal tax rates at the bottom and top skill levels cannot be unambiguously signed. Moreover, we detail the conditions under which migration induces uniformly higher or lower equilibrium marginal tax rates facing both low-and high-skilled workers than their counterparts in autarky, which leads us to conclude that geographic mobility does not always limit the government’s ability to redistribute incomes via tax-transfer systems.



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戴大荣
美国德州农工大学经济学博士,现任上海财经大学高等研究院助理教授,研究兴趣主要为公共经济学,税收和财政预算制度设计,以及知识产权保护。研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Review of Economic Design等知名期刊,主持国家自然科学基金青年项目,参与国家自然科学基金重大项目。