当前位置:首页>>研究前沿

上财高研院杨有智常任副教授2篇文章在国际一流期刊发表

发布日期:2022-09-15设置

近日,我院院长助理杨有智常任副教授的2篇论文“Optimal CEO Turnover”“On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion”(合作者皆为Cheng Wang, 复旦大学)分别在经济学领域顶尖期刊Journal of Economic Theory与经济学领域权威期刊Review of Economic Dynamics正式发表和在线发表,研究最优的CEO更替、动态合约对均衡工资分布的影响。

图片


图片

高等研究院坚持政策研究与学术研究两手抓两手硬。今年以来,研究员累计在《经济研究》、Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等国内外权威期刊上发表24篇论文,其中包括B类及以上期刊19篇,整体发文数量和质量都呈现稳健增长,助力“上财国际2.0”计划的推进和学校国际学术话语权的提升,为百年变局和世纪疫情期间的经济发展贡献智库力量


图片
Optimal CEO Turnover
Abstract: We study a dynamic principal-agent/firm-CEO relationship that is subject simultaneously to moral hazard, limited commitment, and shocks to the CEO's market value. Termination is used as (a) an incentive instrument to punish the CEO for bad performance, (b) a cost minimization device that uses the CEO's outside value as an external means for compensation, and (c) as a means for replacing the incumbent CEO with a less expensive new CEO. Termination occurs after the CEO receives either a sufficiently high or a sufficiently low outside value. The model generates both voluntary and involuntary/forced turnovers, and counter-offers occur on the equilibrium path. The model is calibrated to the U.S. data to capture the key observed features of CEO pay and turnover. It shows that increased moral hazard offers an explanation for the observed increase in the level and variance of CEO compensation, as well as the increase in forced CEO turnover.
图片
On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion
Abstract: We study an equilibrium model of the labor market with identical firms and homogeneous workers, and with search and on-the-job search. Jobs are dynamic contracts that allow firms to match the worker’s outside offers or let the job be terminated. For a non-degenerate distribution of wage offers to arise in the environment, it is necessary and sufficient that (i) there is a positive cost of job turnover, in terminating an existing job or posting a new one; and (ii) there is asymmetric information regarding the worker’s outside offers. The model is calibrated to the U.S. labor market to match observed worker flows and the observed mean-min ratio in wages earned. The calibrated model predicts a unimodal distribution for both wages offered and wages earned




图片
杨有智
美国爱荷华州立大学博士毕业,现任上海财经大学高等研究院院长助理、常任副教授,研究领域为经济理论、宏观经济学、动态契约理论,研究成果发表于Journal of Monetary Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Review of Economic Dynamics、Games and Economic Behavior等权威期刊,参与国家自然科学基金应急项目、专项项目等